peter carmichael. i am the director of the savoie institute here at gettysburg college. i'm also a member of the history department and it's my pleasure to introduce our very first speaker of the morning, pete vermeil, here for you started i just once again show my appreciation for passion and for c-span, c-span and pc. and they've been wonderful partners to gettysburg college and the civil war institute. we're thrilled to have them here today as well. so our first speaker, pete familiar. pete familiar, a graduate of gettysburg college, he graduated in 1994. he's gone on. he's a history teacher at who's satanic valley regional high

school in the falls village, connecticut. pete has been in indispensable to our mission here at the civil war institute. he has been co-director of our high school scholarship program. while you are enjoined talks and programs here, pete has helped shape a curriculum for our high school scholarship winners. they have classes here. of course. they have other special programs. he takes them out on the battlefield. said yesterday to many of you that this high school scholarship program, it has set off a number, a number of very, very fine historians who have gone on. many have gone on to do phds. many have gone on to the national park service. we are extremely grateful to all that pete has done. pete is a civil war historian who specializes in the home front, particularly on north care in north carolina. how about that? as my geography? how about connecticut? especially is connecticut in his

working on a project right now that relates to that. but today he is going to talk about the pipe creek line. so let me welcome pete familiar. hope there'll be no questions on the north carolina home front. thank you, pete. thank you to everyone for being here. it's always a thrill for me to come back and speak at gettysburg college, which of course, is a very special place for me. it's great to be here at the civil war institute after three years so much as change. the mattresses in the dorm haven't changed by. but what's most important is to come and see so many familiar faces, people who've been friends and mentors. to me for 30 years. and i just want to single one person out because he was absolutely instrumental in the talk that i'm going to do today.

and that's dean schultz, known to many as the dean of gettysburg. and what i'm going to talk to you about today is, in many ways the product of many, many days of walking the battlefields with dean schultz. so i wanted to take you into my classroom for one second. and when i work with my students in my classroom, i beg of them to shift the focus. most people know a version of history by reading, you know, the best known account and by reading the best known account, we get an understanding of what that episode in history looks like. but if we choose a different person and we look at the event from their perspective, we see things differently and that's when we learn. and so i think it's safe to say that one reason that gettysburg continue in use to capture the imagined emotion of so many people is because of all the what ifs. what if jeb stuart had not been

off joyriding? what if you all had attacked cemetery hill on the night of july 1st? what if lee had just listened to longstreet? what if stonewall jackson had been here and the commandant nominator of all of those is there all from the confederate side and when we look a little bit at the union side, sometimes we get it. well, what if mead had counterattacked. but our what ifs, our engagement in counterfactual history tends to be on the confederate side. and when we do that, we get a very different perspective of, i think, of the battle. now, one of those union warriors, of course, is what if mead had fallen back to piper creek? and so i want to use that as my jumping off point to talk to you a little bit about piper creek and what it was. but more importantly to me, because i think there's a use in counterfactual history and it can certainly be fun, but sometimes we get into the what

if what if jackson had been here and we forget that there's parts of this battle that we don't look at and there's still things that we don't understand. and that's what i want to use. the piper creek circular to do is to get at the question of how pipe creek impact, what actually happens here at gettysburg. so mead's famous pipe creek circular here laid out it, laid out a contingency plan for his army in the event of disaster oyster in pennsylvania. we'll talk about the specifics of that plan in a few minutes. what's important to establish right now is that in part because of the perception that mead wanted to fall back to pipe creek, he was long and widely depicted as being passive content to fight on the defensive and inflexible. what i believe is more important and what i really want to talk

about today, is that historians have large lee ignored the fact that portion size of meade's pipe creek circular were actually put into effect and that these actions had a dramatic impact on the way in which the battle of gettysburg was fought. it's not just a contingency plan. but first let us back up to those early morning hours of june 28th, 1863, in frederick, maryland, only about 35 miles from here. colonel james hardy of the war department delivered orders, not an offer orders putting adin commanofhe army of the potomac. he also delivered to meet these following orders from general in chief henry halleck. ders to meade. and i do think it's worth spendi aecond to look at these in detail. you will not be hampered by any.

my newnsuctions from these headquarters. your army is free to act as you y em proper under the circumstance forces as they arise. you will, however, keep in view the important fact that the army of the potomac is the coverg army of washington, as well as the army of operate in against the invading force of the rebels. you will therefore maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also baltimore. as far as circumstances wi admi s, generally move upon either of these places. it is expected that you will eier antis of him or arrive with him so as to give them battle. so 's important to note, both for the way that the battle would take shape and for the first few days of meade's pursuit out of lee after the battle, that these are the only instruction that needs going to receive. these are his orders.

until july 7th. and these orders are problematic because meade is given to task to defend baltimore and washington in and be the army of operation against lee. and those are confirmed schlichting things if he's going to protect baltimore and washington. he needs to go on a wide front if he's going to be the army of operation and fight lee. he needs to concentrate his army. if he concentrates his army, that gives lee the opportunity to turn his flank and head for washington in baltimore. if he goes wide, it gives lee an opportunity to concentrate against meade and perhaps defeat his army in detail. and intelligence is also a problem for meade. it's a function of being new to command. he knew richard ewell, second corps of the confederate army was, but he knew much less about the locations of longstreet and hill's corps and knew to his command.

he's not even sure about the exact positions of his own army or the condition of those men. so this is a problem. but me proves to be a quick study. incidentally, let me just throw out to you that when i'm talking to you today is just a summary, an overview of an article that i wrote and gettysburg mag a-z in 2010. so if you're looking for more detail direct, you there. but meade proves to be a quick study and on june 29th he writes to halleck demonstrating that he's achieved greater clarity. this is meade. meade has greater clarity in his thinking. he writes, i have concluded as follows if lee is moving for baltimore, i expect to get between his army in that place. if he is crossing the susquehanna. i shall rely upon general couch with his force holding him until i can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which i shall endeavor to do. so his getting a plan is developing as plan, examining a

map. it's probably really hard to see. i apologize. examining a map. need realize that westminster, maryland, which was the key location for carrying out his orders. and within 18 hours of taking command, he had informed halleck of his intention to move tomorrow on three lines to emmitsburg and westminster. so what did meade see in westminster? the location provided major road and rail connections to both washington and baltimore. and those, of course, were needed. if he was going to block any confederate advance against those cities. meade's chief of artillery, henry hunt, thought its location would help restore to the ranks thousands of stragglers. the road network would bring them there, ample high ground in the westminster area. and again, that road network

provided good opportunities for him to fight either offensively or defend civilly. now all of these are going to become seeds for meade that will grow into the pipe creek circular. meade's orders for june. 30th continued to move his army into positions that would utilize westminster, maryland, as his base of supply. these orders required hard marching despite some of the hottest weather of the campaign. so i think it's important to note for for the battle here at gettysburg, as we talk about effects of this planning on the battle. the union army is making forced marches in the days leading up to the battle. the six corps would march to manchester high ground. that would become the anchor of the right flank of the union army. the fifth corps went to union mills in the center of the line. the third corps to tiny town.

the second corps to frizzle burg, three and a half miles northeast of westminster. there it was going to be a reserve, an act to protect the rear. that's more or less what we're going to see when the pipe creek circular is put out. with the exception of the third corps line being changed. the first corps and the 11th corps are probing the western edges of the union advance, while the 12th corps is probing some of the eastern edges. so it's hunting for lee while he's establishing that line. and that's going to be that contingency line of the pipe creek. so it's clear from meade's orders, it's clear that he's not only thinking defensive of lee, he's actively looking for the enemy. with three infantry corps not simply leaving that task to his cavalry. so if meade's marching orders for the 30th effect establish what he's going to put down on

paper as the pipe creek line, it's worth addressing what appealed to him so much about that location. pipe creek is a tributary of the monaca c river, following a few miles north and west of westminster and the south bank of that creek offers in spots a near intriguing double defensive position along ravines and ridges. and those ravines and ridges are especially located on the roots of the confederate of a potential confederate advance to that position, a road network allowed for a convenient resupply reinforcement and communication. so. meade then dispatches two trusted aides with eyes for topography. right. this is henry hunt on the right. chief artillery and chief engineer. governor warren. down to that line to lay out a

potential line of battle. so to the extent of putting stakes in the ground, hunt thought the greatest strength was that lee could not turn the position without leaving a concentrated and union stacked union army in his rear. all right. so if lee attempts to move around pipe creek, he puts his army in a very vulnerable spot. so facing an inability to turn lee's army excuse me, needs army. lee would have no choice but to attack meade on the high ground. here's what hunt wrote. quote for it can hardly be supplied, meaning lee's army having gone up to pennsylvania. they would fall back without excuse me, i read this wrong for hardly be supposed that having gone up to pennsylvania they would fall back without attacking us. they're there to give battle. hunt continued, it would

probably have been better had meade concentrated his army behind pipe creek rather than at gettysburg. this is battles and leaders. this is 25 years after the war because in case of defeat, meade's line of retreat would have been comparatively short and easily covered. while lee's would be four to marches through an open country before he could gain the mountain passes. so we think about what actually happens, right? lee has a fairly short withdrawal from gettysburg to the mountain passes, but from pipe creek. if lee has to retreat, he's going to be in the open for a much greater distance. it's interesting, by the way, that meade gets the criticism for wanting to to fall back to pipe creek. but here's hunt openly saying we should have done it knowing the result. at 11:30 p.m. on june 30th, secretary of war edwin stanton communicated directly with meade, forwarding a report from brigadier general hermann haupt,

a railroad man. lee is falling back from the vicinity of harrisburg and concentrating all his forces. the concentration appears to be at or near chambersburg. the object apparently a sudden movement against meade, of which he should be advised by courier immediately. so stanton sends this message. lee is concentrating and that's the trigger for meade in his mind. lee's army is concentrating, perhaps for an offensive strike at meade's army, and meade then commits his thinking about the upcoming battle to paper and for distribution to his corps commanders. and that is what we know as the pipe creek circular. circular is too lengthy for us to talk about it today. you can easily find a copy of the whole thing on the line, but i think it's important to talk about a few essential parts, he

writes from information received. the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished. so we've moved our army forward in essence, we've prevented harrisburg from being taken. we forced the concentration of lee's army. then he writes, if the enemy assumes the offensive and attacks, it is meade's intent then to withdraw the army from its current position and form a line of battle along pipe creek line. and he then lays out he then lays out the positions of the union army. so we see the six corps. here's manchester. here's westminster. here's gettysburg. the sixth corps. the fifth corps. the 12th corps. the 11th corps. the first corps. the third corps. and the second corps in reserve.

right. that's the proposed pipe creek line. what's really important is the pipe creek line is not just about these positions. he says other things in it and those become essential, i think, to what happens here at gettysburg. so one thing he says, one thing he says is that in the event that the army is to concentrate, the the fifth corps, george sykes has been in command of the fifth corps only as long as meade's been in command of the army. the fifth corps will fall under the command of henry slocombe. slocombe will command the 12th and the fifth corps. but again, these aren't orders. it's just a contingency plan. he writes, whenever such circumstances arise, as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming the general line indicated a

notice of such movement will be at once communicated to these headquarters and to all adjoining corps commanders. so the responsibility is not needs to give the order. he's empowering his corps commanders. if you need to fall back, fall back to this line, just make sure you tell everybody the goal of it here is to protect the individual core of meade's army. we've got the first corps, the 11th corps, the 12th corps out alone, probing. well, the first and the 11th. right. they're sort of together. and there's a real risk that they're going to be attacked by a concentrated confederate army. if that happens, meade wants them to fall back to pipe creek and let everybody know. there's no time posted on the circular. we don't know what time it's sent out, but we can infer from context that it's probably mid-to-late morning on july first. and of course, what do we know that meade doesn't know? they're already fighting here.

it's a popular view. put forth early on by meade's chief of staff, dan butterfield, and third corps commander dan sickles, and still postulated by some historians today that with a confederate attack imminent, meade wanted to fall back to the pre-established defensive positions at pipe creek. in other words, he had no desire to fight at gettysburg, but other actions that meade takes when viewed in the context of a whole circular bring his true intentions into focus prior to the circular being issued, meade had sent john reynolds with the left wing of the union army, the first, third and 11th corps. and he had told reynolds of a likely confederate concentrate at chambersburg or at a point between chambersburg and york, north of gettysburg. he instructed reynolds, the commanding general, cannot

decide whether this is best policy to move to attack until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concerned. trading. this is what he wants reynolds to do. where is that point? go find the enemy and let us know. he also tells reynolds that in the third corps is division commander andrew humphreys, who has an excellent engineer in ai. and reynolds should use humphreys to find good ground. and then he says to reynolds, the general would like your views. so in his classic book, the get the gettysburg campaign is studying command. edwin coddington wrote that meade's simultaneous order to advance and retreat to pipe creek, quote, seem to reveal extreme vacillation and if not a collapse of moral courage on the part of meade.

hancock believed that reynolds, his movement was only a mask to allow the movement to pipe creek, but that quote, it turned out the enemy's march, the enemy started to march down the same road a little earlier than anticipated. did this message. this is the contingency aspect of pipe creek. meade never wavered from saying he might act defensive or offensively and that the movement of reynolds and slocum is consistent too. looking to land a blow when they find the confederate army. it's important to note that while reynolds was familiar with meade's thinking, he did not receive a written copy of the pipe creek circular. neither did howard, and neither did abner doubleday, who will receive command of the union army excuse me? who will take command of the first corps of the union army? upon reynolds death. what's important is to see

meade's actions once he learns that the battle is under way. when he learned that a battle was underway, when reynolds joined the battle, he sent captain steven weld of his staff to report this to meet. as soon as possible, even if it meant killing his horse. weld reported that reynolds would fight them in the streets, barricading, if necessary, free language, consistent with the type of delaying action necessary for putting the circular into effect. but then events happen that do. the pipe creek circular as a contingency plan. meade writes to hancock and says reynolds didn't receive the circular or he believes reynolds didn't receive the circular and that he might not withdraw along the prescribed path. reynolds on the circular is supposed to go to tiny town, but

he came up to or from the via way of emmitsburg and he may withdraw that way and that would leave a gap in the union line and so he orders hancock to move his division to turn it out. and then meade learns that reynolds has been killed. and this is troubling, of course, not just because they were friends and that reynolds was a very capable general. it meant that no one at gettysburg at that moment was familiar with meade's thinking, or, of course, with the circular. so these are the primary reasons, then, that hancock was sent to gettysburg on july 1st, receiving orders at 1:10 p.m. from chief of staff butterfield to assume command of the troops over howard. howard ranked hancock. meade had discretionary discretionary orders to put people into positions as he saw fit. and here's what hancock has to

do. if you think the ground in position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances. you will so advise the general and he will order all the troops up. you know, the generals views and general warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see general reynolds better position to a comparative term, right? better than the pipe creek position. is this a better place to fight. it's also, i think, important to note that he's not putting all of his trust in hancock. he's also got warren there. but of course, the great irony is that warren, the chief topographical engineer of the union army, gets lost on his way to gettysburg and he's not there on july 1st at this time to see the ground. charles morgan, john hancock's chief of staff, gives us an account. of his boss on the way to gettysburg. hancock is in an ambulance

reviewing maps, but he content purely looked at the ground on the way on the ride that nature of the ground on either side of the road was continually scanned by the general, morgan wrote with a view to the retreat on pipe creek. should he deem it advisable. he's not just looking at the ground at gettysburg, he's not just looking at the ground at pipe creek. he's looking at all the ground in between. where will the retreating army stand? meanwhile, with reynolds dead command of the field passed to oliver, otis, howard. and when howard arrived on the battlefield, he was struck by the defensive, natural defensive strength of cemetery hill. according to lieutenant colonel theodore isenberg of his staff. he said howard said this seems to be a good position. colonel. and isenberg responded, it is the only position, general. now, neither man could have known it, but when howard, at

that moment places von stein, where is division on cemetery hill as a reserve and a rallying point he makes the key decision of the battle because of the way the pipe creek circular would have profound effects. he makes the key decision because of the way the pipe creek circular would have profound effects on the way the battle was fought. so what's going to happen on july 1st is that meade is going to even before he gets a report from hancock, he's going to order the the the sixth corps out of manchester. so need makes a decision to fight at gettysburg meade makes that decision. howard meanwhile is desperately calling for reinforcements, desperately calling for reinforcements. he's calling to slocombe. he is calling to sickles. sickles, to his credit, recognizes this is where the fight is, and he begins to move to gettysburg.

we'll talk more about that in a minute. slocombe case is a little more complicated, but it relates to the pipe creek circular. so slow. got this pipe creek circular or in front of him. perhaps he can hear the sound of battles. perhaps he can't. there's a debate about that. but meade sent him that order. he got the circular and then he got an order from meade putting him in charge of the fifth and the 12th corps. remember what the circular said? if this plan goes into effect, you're in command of the fifth and 12th corps. he gets that. then he gets an order saying, you're in command of the fifth and 12th corps. i think you might read that as the circular is in effect. and so when slocombe is getting call after call after call from howard on july one, begging him to come to the field in gettysburg and slocombe doesn't move. i would argue it's because he has the pipe creek circular.

he knows what that is calling for. at 6 p.m.. meade writes to hancock and doubleday saying, i hope slocombe is on the field. if we get all our people up and attack with our whole force tomorrow. we are to defeat whatever force the enemy has. so he's thinking offense of lee thinking offensively in the early evening of july 1st. the pipe creek as a defensive contingency plan is gone, but it's continuing to affect things as we see with slocombe. he writes to halleck at 6 p.m. on the first this is need. i see. no other course than to hazard a general battle. and he means at gettysburg. all right. so here's this plan. dissolving with three union corps in the area and three others within a reasonable march to gettysburg, meade sensed an opportunity to strike the confederate force before

longstreet comes up. what does the union army know that they are fort hill and that they are fort ewell? if we can concentrate our force, we can land a blow. perhaps before longstreet comes up. i would argue this is further evidence that the pipe creek plan is simply a contingency and not something that meade was planning to do. historian glenn tucker has argued that pipe creek was abandoned because it was easier to stay at gettysburg than to retreat. and he's not wrong. hunt wrote on the evening of july 1st to have withdrawn them now would have been a retreat and might have discouraged the federals, as it certainly would have. elated the confederate troops, especially as injurious reports unjust to both the corps named have been circulated. it would have been to admit defeat when there was no defeat. in addition to background of

mead's thinking about pipe creek and what it says about him as a general, it's important to note that the pipe creek line had significant impacts on the way this battle was fought. so we'll just go through some of these and then we can have some questions on the conversation about more. if you would like. sickles comes urgently to gettysburg, comes rapidly to gettysburg when he gets the calls from howard. but he also has a pipe creek circular right, directing him to do other things. and so he doesn't bring the whole third corps with him. he brings he leaves two corps behind. and in emmitsburg. all right. just sort of to sort of carry it out. out. right. to carry out that aspect of the pipe creek line. and those two brigades will arrive in gettysburg shortly before the july 2nd battle begins. here's what sickles writes

about. it. nothing lasts, nothing less than the earnest and frequent appeals of general howard and his supposed danger to could have induced me to move from the position assigned to me in general, orders. but i believe the emergency justified my movement. it's kind of interesting, isn't it, that we might applaud sickles for that on july 1st, but on july 2nd, when he thinks there's an emergency and he veers from his orders. still, when day broke on july 2nd, the third course down two brigades, henry slocombe in the 12th corps. there's going to be problems from the start. we talked about his late coming to the battlefield. but i also want to point out is that slocombe acts throughout the battle, at least until july 3rd, as though he is a wing commander and that he is in charge of the 12th and the fifth corps. and this is going to lead to some serious even tragic

ramifications in the battle. and we'll talk more about that in a minute. but i think this is the key, the pipe creek circular makes west minster the nerve center for the union army. it's the communications center. it's the supply center. it's where the wagons are sent. and that doesn't change. westminster's going to remain the nerve center of the union army. it's going to cause some problems because it's so far away. it's not a rail connection, right? the union army doesn't have access to a lot of roads to move reinforcements and especially to resupply its men. but i think the important thing here and how this shapes the battle is we all have our own

image, our minds about what we think is the most important thing here at gettysburg is a little round top. is it is it cemetery hill? but i would have to tell you that it's clear to me that nothing is more important to meade in his thinking than protecting the baltimore pike. the baltimore pike is the road to westminster here. if he loses the baltimore pike, he's cut off from his communications. he's cut off from his supplies. and he has an enormous problem. let me give you just one. one little thing here on the importance of the baltimore pike. just on july 3rd, just on july third, 60,000 rations and 250 head of cattle for the third corps alone came up the baltimore pike. nearly every decision that meat in the union high command make in the battle except those that are forced upon him by sickles, is movement the emmitsburg road

line nearly every other action made by the union high command was done to strengthen the army's grip on the baltimore pike. when the 12th corps began to arrive on the field and i don't know why i have a picture of john sedgwick up here because he's from the neighboring town where that i live in. and so we want to give him credit. we should have henry slocombe up here, the 12th corps, when they arrive on the field, they're sent to ben hill. that's right. because this will not only protect the right of barlow's division, but it will also protect access to cemetery hill around the union right flank on july 1st when the retreat happens on july 1st. when the retreat happens, let's go. i think i jumped ahead too early here. yes, that's what happened.

see, we have. what mead is doing here on july first is and of course, he's not there. right. mead protects the baltimore flank, but he's not there. but the union army is protecting the baltimore flank through this defense in depth right here, cemetery hill and culp's hill. here's a second line. we come down here. here's a third line down here. here's a fourth line all on the baltimore pike. right. defensive positions that can be fall back, falling back to and protected as near it. the 12th corps artillery is sent to powers hill geary's brigade. excuse me, geary's division is sent north of little round top to prevent access from the west. ranger national park service ranger troy harmon has written any line of defense at gettysburg had to center on and

fortify by the baltimore pike. we today look at cemetery hill as the key to that because we know how the battles fought. but we have to also look at powers hill further south. we have to look at zion hill. there's a whole series of union army defensive positions down the baltimore pike. the six corps, when they're ordered to gettysburg, they're the largest in the union army, butterfield writes to sedgwick, we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence. and so sedgwick starts them on the most direct route through town to gettysburg, but several miles into their march, they get ready. directed by butterfield, they get redirected to go via union mills and little's town. why? because that way they're going to come up the baltimore pike. it gets them here later, but it gets them in a more strategic

position. and what is sedgwick told when you get your men here, have them ready to attack because meade is looking to attack the next morning he arrives here at midnight. give or take on the first. and he is looking to perhaps attack in the in the gap right here between we have powers, hill and culp's hill and wolf hill and some cherry hill and culp's hill. and there's this gap there on the union right. and meade is tariff side that it's going to provide easy access for the confederate army to the baltimore pike and he's thinking about that as his point of attack. so sends slocombe out he sends warren out to investigate that ground and they report it is impossible or impossible here to attack a 3 p.m. on july 2nd.

meade writes to halleck, if not attacked and i can get any positive information on the position of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, i shall attack if i find it hazardous to do so, or i'm satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and washington. i shall fall back to westminster right? if i'm not attacked, i'll attack. if they get flanks, i'm going to fall back to westminster. so he gets a lot of criticism for being overly focused on his right. he's getting warnings from sickles, right? he's getting warning from other people about longstreet, perhaps. but i think it's worth noting that the right is much closer to the baltimore pike than his left. and if you look at the history of the confederate attacks on the first, they typically are going from the union left to the right. it's not planned that way.

right. but meade doesn't know that. where might the next fall in this an echelon series attacks. so of course he doesn't attack. and he receives the attack. but there's a few other things we want to point out here about the importance of the baltimore pike. when the six corps does arrive, they do something here very interesting with their artillery. here's the baltimore pike. here's rock tree. here's the sixth corps artillery on zion hill. and look what they do. they set themselves up to protect in the baltimore pike from an attack in any direction. we also know that meade perhaps greatest blunder of the campaign, the battle pulling those 12 corps units off of

culp's hill. what are those 12 corps units do their gear is brigade. here is division candy and cane. they get lost. they marched off the battlefield when they march off the battlefield, what do they do? they put themselves in line of battle, protecting the baltimore pike, almost as though it's the default for the union army. i think we should put all the blame on geary because i do want to touch on this. the 12th corps, the 12th corps has come in confusion. slocombe thinks he's a wing commander. alpheus williams thinks he's a corps commander. thomas ruger thinks he's a division commander. silas colegrove thinks he's a brigade commander, right? me doesn't think this. in fact, you may know this that meade the 12th corps takes exception to meade's official report of the battle because they believe the 12th corps

slighted and that meade doesn't give will the arms and the 12th corps credit as mentioned in williams's report and meets it. i didn't know williams was commanding the 12th corps. right. i mean, this is the army commander. so there's confusion here. and it would be a comedy, except that it's a comedy of errors and it's a tragic comedy because of here what happens in the spangler medal, right? so the pipe creek circular sets in this command confusion in the 12th corps and in this confusion, we see these two brigades, the 27th indiana and the second massachusetts launching what's virtually a suicide assault across the spangler medal. right, colonel? much of the second famously said, well, it's murder, but it's an order they should write. they recognize they shouldn't be doing this, but it's the result of poor staff work, poorly communicated orders from men who don't really know what their roles are.

so we see command of this confusion in multiple places. we see it when william shows up at the council of war on the night of the second, and he doesn't really know why he's there. we talked about the official report. okay. and we should also point out that what's going on with with the second mass and the taunting, the 27th indiana is part of a larger union counterattack at culp's hill because those confederates simply got too close to the baltimore pike. they have to be driven out of that position by we see two other threats, right. two other threats to the baltimore pike that have to be dealt with. one, of course results in the fight at east cavalry field, the critical road network there, east cavalry field, the low dutch road. right. that can provide access to the baltimore pike should it fall into confederate hands. and the action at what's officially neal avenue and where

dean schultz has taken me so many times, the lost avenue, right? that's thomas neal's brigade of the six corps skirmishing with elements of the stonewall brigade only a few hundred yards from the baltimore pike. it has to be protected. meade's decision to shape the ships, his base to westminster, and the subsequent actions that resulted from the pike creek circular, continued after the battle ended with the repulsive pickett's charge. meade could not attack counterattack with the sixth corps. he could not do it because the six corps is scattered over the field. they're protecting access to the tiny town road and by extension, the baltimore pike, south of the battlefield. and they're on neal avenue on the north end of the battlefield. they've been spread all over, and they're on culp's hill. meade also could not pursue a direct pursuit of lee. he could not begin a direct pursuit of lee after the battle because he's still operating

under those orders to protect baltimore and washington if he's too aggressive, it's going to put one of those cities at risk. so let me conclude by saying this gettysburg is too often viewed from a confederate perspective. lee's battle plans are hotly debated. meade's or not, aside from the dan sickles controversy, they're not often discussed to a certain extent. this implies that the battle was lee's to lose, that meade was a passive general who simply awaited assaults, and that the union victory was somehow the result of confederate mistakes. these are unfortunate conclusions. if the battle of gettysburg, viewed through the lens of the pipe creek circular or meade, is seen as a general who laid careful plans for multiple contingencies, is and who reached for opportune ease when they presented themselves. in short, meade is seen as an

active general seeking to seize the initiative. similarly, when viewed through the lens of the pipe, creek's the battle itself looks different. the baltimore pike, rather than say, little round top or the angle, becomes the key piece of terrain and a broad union tactical plan designed to protect the pike emerges for too long, the pipe creek circular has simply been seen as a what if yet, while it remains entertaining to debate the counterfactual possibilities of union withdrawal to the pipe creek line, it's more significant to analyze is how the fact that certain aspects of the circular were enacted both affected the way the battle of gettysburg was fought and spawned controversies that linger to this day. thank you. we have time for questions.

we have time for questions. yeah, please use the mics, please. would you talk a little bit about the road networks leading south from gettysburg and if meade had been engaged and decided to fall back, what would that have looked like? yeah. and then also the other huge controversy battles longstreet's suggestion to move to the right. is that even possible or even feasible or even imaginable? not a counterfactual, but just looking at the road. sure, sure. so the road networks, right. so how many times have we all heard of gettysburg spot because of the roads that are here? and if we're talking specifically about the roads going south. right. well, the emmitsburg road, by the afternoon of july 2nd. so remember, so much of the union army comes up on the emmitsburg road even on the morning of july 2nd, early morning, july 2nd. but of course, by 4:00 ish. right. that's no longer possible. so what mead has for his access

south is the tiny town road and the baltimore road. and the baltimore road leads to his to his to his base of communications and supply. and is also a much better road. right. so so that's that's the key approach to the second part about long street. i think we have a debating long street panel, don't we? so i'll say something, but it's probably better answered in that panel tomorrow. it's yeah, i don't see it as being real feasible a number of reasons. right. you have significant elements of the six core out there, especially later, later, and especially on the third, especially on the third. do they know where the roads are? they don't have cavalry that they trust to find the road network for them. and i also think that sometimes we lose sight of this. we always talk about long street moving that way. but if long street moves that

way, how far is the gap between longstreet's corps and the remainder of the confederate army? right. so if we think that what's meade afraid of here, that that sparks the pipe creek circular. he's afraid that one or two of his corps are going to be defeated in detail. they're one corps is going to be pounced upon. you know, that's presenting that opportunity for me to do in reverse. thank you. some recent work, suggests reynolds mead wanted reynolds to lure lee towards emmitsburg and the pipe creek line. is that what you're comments on? yeah, i think kent masterson brown suggests that in his wonderful and then i think in looking at that i don't know that he's trying to lure him to pipe creek. i think he's trying to feel him out and lure him into battle. now he's got pipe creek there as that as as that contingency.

that doesn't mean it has to happen there. right. and think about what hancock's doing. are there any better places in between? but i do think that reynolds is probably there to find the confederates, identify their location and pin them into battle. thanks. well, yeah, pete, the the talk about the command confusion in the 12th or sparked a question to me wasn't the wing for me or the wing organization for maneuver only and once they maneuvering the wing organization would fall away. that's at least that's the understanding i had. yeah, i think that that's my understanding as well. with some exceptions, right? he's making some battlefield decisions here like hancock command of the third corps on the afternoon of the second. right. and. i will say this about the about the wing command of that wing goes in the battle. the senior commander is going to be in charge of the field. so so that would be in that

case, in the battle. that would be still be reynolds. but i do think. right. i mean, this is part of what leads to this confusion in the 12th corps and apparently slocombe is told that the council of war on the night of the second there's there's no wing command here. right. but we but by that point, i mean, we know that slocombe, in response to the to the confederate seizure of the trenches on lower culp's hill, so says drive him out at dawn. and then turns over operation of that to williams so now what's going on there in the 12th call is clearly confusion. i'm not you know, in terms of what sparking it at that point there's still clearly confusion. yeah, it seems to me that the slocombe was the one who was confused. yes. as soon as he got to gettysburg, he should have been reverted automatically back to the 12th corps commander. agree. but slocombe is one who gets

both of these pieces right. he gets this thing saying, here's the pipe creek circular that may or may not go into effect. and here's another order that's consistent with the circular, the i and i understand the confusion. thanks. do you have any information on why reynolds did not get the pipe creek circular? it seems like everybody else got it. you know, did he? well, yeah. well, one logistical reason is that everyone else is much closer to mead. right. and reynolds is being is is is being sent forward of the rest of the positions of the army and i don't know that this is part of it, but reynolds knows mead's thinking. they had been in communication about it. so so i think it's fair to say he knows what mead wants done regarding this of whether he got

the pipe creek circular or not. the real danger is when reynolds is killed and nobody else is aware. right? that's when they really start to worry. what if they retreat away from the rest of the army right. that sets up now that situation where you've got isolated corps and he has and mead has to go into action to to to protect against that. thank you. yes. all right. thanks so much. thank you